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Declarative memory is known to depend on the medial temporal lobe memory system. Recently, there has
been renewed focus on the relationship between the basal ganglia and declarative memory, including the
involvement of striatum. However, the contribution of striatum to declarative memory retrieval remains
unknown. Here, we review neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence for the involvement of the stria-
tum in declarativememory retrieval. From this review, we propose that, alongwith the prefrontal cortex (PFC),
the striatum primarily supports cognitive control of memory retrieval. We conclude by proposing three
hypotheses for the specific role of striatum in retrieval: (1) striatum modulates the re-encoding of retrieved
items in accord with their expected utility (adaptive encoding), (2) striatum selectively admits information
into working memory that is expected to increase the likelihood of successful retrieval (adaptive gating),
and (3) striatum enacts adjustments in cognitive control based on the outcome of retrieval (reinforcement
learning).Introduction
Declarative memory retrieval refers to the conscious recovery of
previously stored experiences, facts, and concepts that are veri-
fiable through verbal report (Tulving, 1972). It has long been
known that the medial temporal lobe (MTL) system is necessary
for the formation, consolidation, and retrieval of declarative
memories (Cohen et al., 1997; Squire, 1992). By contrast, other
types of long-term memory, such as skill learning or classical
conditioning do not appear to require the MTL memory system
(Corkin, 1968; Knowlton et al., 1994; Cohen et al., 1997). Rather,
these forms of ‘‘nondeclarative’’ memory are strongly associated
with the reward driven mechanisms of the basal ganglia
(Packard et al., 1989; Knowlton et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1997;
Shohamy et al., 2004). However, mounting evidence from both
neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies of declarative
memory have renewed focus on interactions between the
declarative and nondeclarative systems, and have highlighted
the potential role of the basal ganglia, including striatum
(Figure 1A), in declarative memory performance both at encod-
ing and retrieval (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010; Cohn et al.,
2010; Han et al., 2010; Long et al., 2010; Poldrack and Foerde,
2008; Moustafa and Gluck, 2011).
Outside of the long-term memory domain, there has been
growing recognition of a broader role for striatal-frontal interac-
tions beyond basic motor control. Specifically, recent years
have seen a growth in our understanding of the mechanisms by
which striatum supports higher cognitive functions like working
memory, decision making, categorization, and cognitive control
(Graybiel and Mink, 2009; Doll and Frank, 2009; Cools, 2011;
Seger and Miller, 2010; Landau et al., 2009; Stelzel et al., 2010;
Lewis et al., 2004; Badre and Frank, 2012; Badre et al., 2012).
However, to date, we still have a limited understanding of the
role of these striatal mechanisms in declarativememory retrieval.
Here, we review evidence for the involvement of the striatum
in declarative memory retrieval. First, based on evidence from380 Neuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies of declarative
memory, we argue that, along with the prefrontal cortex (PFC),
the striatum supports the cognitive control of memory retrieval.
Then, leveraging models of reinforcement learning and cognitive
control theory outside of the memory domain, we propose a
set of novel hypotheses regarding the potential mechanistic
role of the striatum in declarative memory as a basis for future
research.
Striatal Responses to Item Recognition
An adaptive function of the declarative memory system is
the ability to discriminate items and contexts with which an
animal has prior experience versus those that are novel. The
ability to recognize previously encountered items is known to
require MTL structures, including perirhinal, parahippocampal,
and hippocampal cortex (Squire, 1992; Schacter and Wagner,
1999; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Squire andWixted, 2011). Never-
theless, the wider view afforded by functional neuroimaging
studies has provided initial evidence for striatal involvement
during item discrimination; though this system has rarely been
a focus of these experiments.
In the item recognition paradigm, participants first encode
a series of items, usually words or pictures, and are then shown
a mix of items that they had seen previously during encoding
along with new items that have not been seen before. For each
item, the participant judges whether the item has been seen
previously (old) or not (new). Thus, contrasting trials on which
participants correctly judged an old item as ‘‘old’’ (hits) against
trials on which a participant correctly judged a new item as
‘‘new’’ (correct rejections [CR]) probes the neural correlates of
‘‘retrieval success.’’
Since the earliest event-related fMRI studies of the item-
recognition task (i.e., Buckner et al., 1998; Donaldson et al.,
2001; Rombouts et al., 2001), retrieval success has yielded stria-
tal activation. Moreover, this effect has been replicated across
Figure 1. Basic Anatomy of the Basal
Ganglia and Schematic of Frontostriatal
Circuitry
(A) Locations of basal ganglia structures are out-
lined on coronal slices (caudate, putamen, and
nucleus accumbens [NAcc]); GPe, external seg-
ment of the globus pallidus; GPi, internal segment
of the globus pallidus; SNc, substantia nigra pars
compacta; and STN, subthalamic nucleus.
(B) Schematic of frontal-striatal circuitry and the
VTA-hippocampus loop. Projections from frontal
cortex through the striatum (caudate, putamen,
and nucleus accumbens), subthalamic nucleus
(STN), globus pallidus, and thalamus drive adap-
tive gating of working memory representations.
The VTA-hippocampal loop includes direct
projections from ventral tegmental area (VTA) to
hippocampus, and a circuit through the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) and globus pallidus from the
hippocampus to VTA. The striatum is frequently
characterized by a dorsal/ventral division (e.g.
Bornstein and Daw, 2011), with different subre-
gions of caudate and putamen existing on both
sides of the divide. Green arrows indicate excit-
atory connections; red circles indicate inhibitory
connections; blue diamonds indicate modulatory
connections. GPe: external segment of the globus
pallidus; GPi: internal segment of the globus
pallidus; SNc: substantia nigra pars compacta.
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Spaniol and colleagues (2009) analyzed 81 fMRI studies of
episodic memory, a subset of which included contrasts of
encoding success (subsequent hits greater than misses) and/or
retrieval success (hits greater than CR). A quantitative meta-
analytic procedure indicated that retrieval success consistently
activated striatum across studies, including both dorsal striatum
in the left caudate and ventral striatum in regions of caudate,
putamen, and nucleus accumbens (also see Kim, 2011).
Figure 2 shows this effect in an updated recoding and reanalysis
of these data conducted for this review. Moreover, a contrast
between retrieval success and encoding success showed that
the ventral caudate was more reliably associated with retrieval
success than encoding success across studies. Importantly,
retrieval success in striatum is not dependent on an actual
prior experience with an item. Rather, striatum shows greater
activation for false alarms (new items incorrectly judged as
old) than CR or misses (Abe et al., 2008). Thus, like most
regions showing retrieval success effects (Wagner et al., 2005),
striatal activation tracks the perception of an item as being
old during a recognition memory task, rather than it having
been previously encountered on the study list. Thus, striatal
retrieval success effects cannot be trivially explained based
on a prior association with positive reinforcement formed at
encoding.
Generally consistent with the neuroimaging data, deficits in
patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD)—a disease arising from
degeneration of cells in the substantia nigra that are a primary
source of dopaminergic input into the striatum (Figure 1B)—indi-Neuron 7cate that the basal ganglia are broadly
necessary for normal levels of recogni-
tion memory performance. In particular,though not suffering from the profound amnesias accompanying
MTL damage, PD patients do demonstrate deficits in recognition
memory relative to controls in studies with sufficient power
(Whittington et al., 2000).
Accounting for these recognition deficits in PD has proven
difficult and multifaceted. Across studies, deficits have been
evident sometimes in recollection (Barnes et al., 2003; Edelstyn
et al., 2007, 2010; Drag et al., 2009) and sometimes in familiarity
(Davidson et al., 2006; Weiermann et al., 2010). Moreover, there
seems ample evidence that at least a portion of memory deficits
observed in PD arise from a failure to engage in effective encod-
ing strategies (Knoke et al., 1998; Vingerhoets et al., 2005).
However, a recent study has provided convincing evidence for
a recollection deficit in PD when encoding strategy was
controlled. Cohn et al. (2010) had PD patients and age-matched
controls study word pairs under shallow and deep encoding
conditions, and estimated familiarity and recollection using the
process-dissociation procedure (Yonelinas et al., 1995). Relative
to shallow encoding, deep encoding normalized the patients’
familiarity relative to the controls, demonstrating the efficacy
of the deep encoding manipulation. However, whereas recollec-
tion improved for controls when items were deeply encoded,
patients showed no improvement in recollection for deeply en-
coded items. As also noted by the authors, this retrieval deficit
could be interpreted as a failure of the ‘‘executive’’ component
of retrieval, such that patients did not take strategic advantage
of the elaborative encoding strategy. We will return to the ques-
tion of executive (i.e., cognitive control) deficits below. However,
regardless of the specific source of the deficit, the evidence for5, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 381
Figure 2. Comparison of Activations from Meta-analyses and Neuroimaging Data Regarding Basal Ganglia Involvement in Novelty
Detection, Reward Processing, and Declarative Memory
Points labeled A through K are the basal ganglia foci reported in the respective studies. Colored areas are from our recoding and reanalysis of the relevant studies
from the Spaniol et al. (2009) and Kim (2011) meta-analyses in GingerALE Version 2.1.1 (brainmap.org) in Talaraich space. Areas associated with objective
recollection are shown in red and areas associated with retrieval success are shown in green; their overlap is marked in blue. Points labeled L are the foci from the
meta-analysis reported by Spaniol et al. (2009). See themain text and individual references formore information about individual contrasts. CR, correct rejections.
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seems compelling.
It should be noted, however, that PD is not a selective striatal
disorder, making it difficult to assign deficits to striatum
specifically, as opposed to frontal disruption or dysfunctional
dynamics within the broader basal ganglia system. However,
recognition deficits in PD indicate that the nigra-striatal
dopamine system is broadly necessary for retrieval. Moreover,
declarative memory deficits have been demonstrated in a variety
of disease conditions involving the nigra-striatal dopamine
system such as Huntington’s disease, which is more localizable
to striatum, and schizophrenia (e.g., Hodges et al., 1990;
van Oostrom et al., 2003; Solomon et al., 2007). Thus, when
considered together with the neuroimaging data that localizes
retrieval effects within the striatum, the evidence begins to
converge on a necessary role for these structures during
retrieval. However, as will be discussed below, this role likely
relates to the way that memory retrieval is modulated by retrieval
goals, as opposed to being a source of the mnemonic signal
itself.
Striatal Responses to Item Novelty
The apparent sensitivity of striatum to perceived oldness is,
perhaps, surprising in light of the established association of the
broader mesolimbic/nigra-striatal dopamine system with the
opposite property, namely item novelty. Physiological recording
studies in the rodent (Schultz, 1998; Horvitz et al., 1997; Horvitz,
2000) have observed activation to stimulus novelty of cells in the
ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra (SN). Impor-
tantly, novelty responses in these cells are modulated by
salience and goal relevance of the novel stimulus and are sepa-
rable experimentally from the established responses of these
cells to expected reward (e.g., Horvitz, 2000). Similar effects of
item novelty in SN/VTA have also been observed in human
fMRI studies (Bunzeck and Du¨zel, 2006) and are again separable
from reward-related activation.
Novelty responses in the SN/VTA are hypothesized to arise via
inputs from the hippocampus (Lisman and Grace, 2005), which
computes the novelty of encountered items. Novelty responses
in VTA neurons, in turn, are hypothesized to project back to
hippocampus where they may enhance encoding of the novel
item through dopaminergic modulation of hippocampal long-382 Neuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.term potentiation (LTP). This hippocampal-VTA loop can serve
the adaptive function of selectively enhancing encoding for novel
items that are behaviorally relevant for the animal (Lisman and
Grace, 2005; Shohamy and Adcock, 2010). Evidence from
human fMRI studies has been consistent with this hypothesis,
demonstrating that novelty at encoding elicits responses in
SN/VTA that are associated with beneficial effects on subse-
quent memory (Wittmann et al., 2007; Schott et al., 2004; Krebs
et al., 2009).
Importantly, as noted above, SN/VTA cells also provide
dopaminergic input into the striatum (Figure 1B) where the infor-
mation they convey about expected reward and other behavior-
ally relevant features of an input, like novelty, can influence
learning, action selection, and decision-making. For example,
when harvesting reward in a stochastic environment, strategi-
cally directing exploratory behavior to novel items has the poten-
tial to glean the most new information about that environment
(Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Daw et al., 2006; Frank et al.,
2009; Badre et al., 2012). Indeed, striatal novelty responses
have been specifically associated with novelty-driven choices
during economic decisions (Guitart-Masip et al., 2010; Wittmann
et al., 2008; Krebs et al., 2009). Moreover, many studies citing
SN/VTA activation in response to novelty, also report responses
to novel greater than familiar items in the striatum (e.g., Bunzeck
and Du¨zel, 2006; Guitart-Masip et al., 2010). Notably, these acti-
vations fall in close proximity to those associated with retrieval
success (Figure 2).
Thus, considered together with retrieval success effects, the
evidence for novelty responses in the striatum argues against
obligatory coding of item oldness in striatum as a consequence
of episodic retrieval. Rather, striatal responses to episodic
memory signals are likely modulated depending on the adaptive
significance of ‘‘oldness’’ or ‘‘newness’’ to the animal’s current
actions and desired outcomes.
Two recent findings provide support for this hypothesis.
Bunzeck et al. (2010) showed that responses in the striatum
are scaled adaptively based on expectations of the relative
novelty and oldness of items in the environment. Han et al.
(2010) more directly manipulated the goal relevance of item
novelty versus oldness and revealed a similar dynamic flexibility
in striatal responses. Specifically, retrieval goals were manipu-
lated by associating either ‘‘old’’ or ‘‘new’’ responses with
Figure 3. Striatal Activation Modulated by
Incentive in Han et al. (2010)
Activation in caudate tracking the incentivized
response—either hits or correct rejections (CR)—
regardless of whether or not explicit feedback (FB)
was present, suggesting that striatal activity can
be driven by incentives and goal-relevant
responses (adapted with permission from Han
et al., 2010).
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tivized, participants earned money for correct old responses
(hits) and lost money for incorrect old responses (false alarm)
and neither gained nor lost money for ‘‘new’’ responses (and
vice versa when ‘‘new’’ was incentivized). Activity in the caudate
tracked the incentivized response independent of whether the
item was studied or novel (Figure 3). It should be noted that
this pattern was seen regardless of whether or not participants
received explicit feedback after their response, suggesting that
striatal activity can be driven by satisfaction of internal goals
and incentives.
Of course, a key question is whether these results can be
reconciled with retrieval success effects, when there is no overt
incentive to locate old versus new items. First, as is evident in
Figure 2, the subregion of caudate that demonstrated these
dynamic effects matched closely that observed across studies
of retrieval success. Second, in a condition where neither
response was incentivized, Han and colleagues (2010) found
greater activity for hits compared to correct rejections, consis-
tent with previous work. Similarly, striatal activity was seen for
hits even when new responses were incentivized. Thus, all else
being equal, participants subjectively valued ‘‘old’’ responses
more than ‘‘new’’ responses when performing recognition
memory tasks.
In summary, the evidence fromstudies of retrieval success and
novelty detection indicates that striatum plays a role in the basic
ability to behave according to the oldness or novelty of an item.
Though in light of the qualitative differences in the severity of
memory deficits accompanying striatal versus MTL dysfunction,
it is unlikely that striatum is the source of memory signals
conveying oldness versus novelty. Accordingly, as with percep-
tual and other inputs to the striatal system, MTL signals coding
item novelty or oldness will elicit striatal responses dependent
on the value of this information for current behavioral goals.
Importantly, however, goals need not be restricted to
outcomes achieved through overt behavior. Rather, the process
of retrieval itself can be conducted with the expectation of
a particular information retrieval outcome. For example, when
trying to remember a recent conversation with a good friend,
we might try thinking of our friend’s face as a cue. We adopt
this strategy with the implicit expectation that it will yield an
outcome that meets our goal, namely remembering our previousNeuron 7conversation. To distinguish this type of
outcome from an exogenous reward or
behavioral goal, we will refer to this type
of desired information retrieval outcome
as a retrieval goal. In what follows, we
will argue that the striatum is particularlyimportant for declarative memory when cognitive control is
required to achieve a retrieval goal.
Striatum and the Cognitive Control of Memory
The ability to internally modulate ongoing processing based on
goals, expectations, and strategies is generally referred to as
cognitive control. As introduced above, in the context of
memory, cognitive control mechanisms are important for guiding
and monitoring retrieval in order to achieve a particular retrieval
goal. Cognitive control of memory has an established depen-
dence on frontal lobe function, evident in the unique memory
impairments of frontal lobe patients. In contrast to the profound
amnesia seen in patients with damage to the hippocampus and
associated MTL areas (Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire, 1986,
1992), patients with damage to PFC demonstrate deficits in
memory tasks that involve strategic control of memory, goal-
directed manipulation of mnemonic information, or overcoming
interference (Moscovitch, 1992; Stuss et al., 1994; Wheeler
et al., 1995; Aly et al., 2011; Thompson-Schill et al., 1998).
Neuroimaging studies have contributed specificity, highlighting
different frontal systems in support of separate control pro-
cesses that contribute to these demanding retrieval tasks (e.g.,
Badre et al., 2005; Badre and Wagner, 2007; Buckner, 1996;
Buckner et al., 1998; Poldrack et al., 1999; Anderson et al.,
2004; Kuhl et al., 2007; Yonelinas et al., 2005; Gallo et al.,
2010; Long et al., 2010). Importantly, similar lines of neuroimag-
ing and neuropsychological evidence also implicate the striatum
in the cognitive control of declarative memory retrieval.
Cognitive Control of Episodic Retrieval
Within the episodic retrieval domain, sourcememory tasks place
explicit demands on cognitive control. In a source memory
experiment, participants are required to verify a specific detail
from a prior encoding event, such as indicating what type of
task was performed with the item. In these tasks, the retrieval
goal is explicit and highly specific, and so retrieval must
be directed to successful recovery of only the task-relevant
‘‘source’’ detail to exclusion of other competing details. Thus,
source memory decisions involve greater demands on cognitive
control mechanisms than do simple item recognition decisions.
Contrasts between source and item recognition memory
consistently locate activation in a network of frontal and parietal
regions that include the striatum. In their meta-analysis,5, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 383
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(i.e., ‘‘objective recollection’’) in left dorsal caudate, overlapping
with the left dorsal striatal focus observed for retrieval success
(Figure 2). In our reanalysis and recoding of these data, we found
that the effects in caudate were evident both for studies con-
trasting correct source versus correct item decisions and those
contrasting correct versus incorrect source decisions. Thus, the
preferential effects of source memory in caudate were neither
simply due to performing the more difficult source task nor
merely to successful retrieval, irrespective of whether it was
goal directed or not.
Importantly, the association of striatum with source memory
relative to item decisions is not necessarily reflective of the
contribution of recollection versus familiarity in these two types
of tasks. Studies that have distinguished between spontaneous
recollection versus familiarity during item recognition (such as is
assessed by using the remember/know procedure) have not
consistently located activation in the striatum when participants
merely experienced recollection relative to familiarity. Direct
contrast of source retrieval versus recollection during item
recognition indicated that left caudate was more consistently
observed across studies of source memory (Spaniol et al.,
2009). Thus, the need for cognitive control, as opposed to the
mere occurrence of recollection, modulates striatal activation
during episodic memory retrieval.
PD patients also demonstrate consistent deficits in cognitive
control of memory. In general, PD patients show greater deficits
in less structured retrieval contexts, such as free recall para-
digms, relative to recognition memory paradigms (Taylor et al.,
1990; Dubois et al., 1991; Zgaljardic et al., 2003). Though likely
partially arising from ineffective encoding (Knoke et al., 1998;
Vingerhoets et al., 2005), their deficits on these tasks could
also be traced to a failure to employ effective retrieval strategies.
For example, studies using the California Verbal Learning Test
(Delis et al., 1987) have shown that PD patients show decreased
semantic clustering at retrieval relative to controls (van Oostrom
et al., 2003; Brønnick et al., 2011). Thus, deficits in recall among
PD patients may partially be traced to a failure to effectively
employ strategic control processes at retrieval.
Cognitive control during memory retrieval is also important to
overcome interference, such as that arising through automatic
retrieval of irrelevant information. PD patients show difficulty
in overcoming such memory interference (Helkala et al.,
1989; Rouleau et al., 2001; but see Sagar et al., 1991). Again,
though likely partly due to encoding, these effects may also be
attributable to retrieval deficits. For example, Crescentini and
colleagues (2011) employed a part-list cuing paradigm designed
to induce interference via external retrieval cues. PD patients
and healthy age-matched controls studied separate word lists
under shallow and deep encoding. Following shallow encoding,
both groups showed decreased retrieval in the interference
condition relative to a noninterference control. In contrast,
following deep encoding, control participants showed equivalent
performance in the interference and control condition, while
the patients still showed impaired retrieval in the interference
condition. Thus, akin to the result from Cohn et al. (2010) in
recognition memory, this part-list cueing effect could be
interpreted as a failure to effectively take advantage of a good384 Neuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.encoding strategy at retrieval; in this case, in order to overcome
interference.
Cognitive Control of Semantic Retrieval
Striatal involvement in the cognitive control of declarative
memory retrieval generalizes beyond MTL-dependent episodic
memory to include semantic memory retrieval. Semantic
memory refers to knowledge of facts, concepts, andwordmean-
ings that are independent of a specific encoding context and that
may be stored in a distributed neocortical representation outside
of the medial temporal lobe (Tulving, 1972; McClelland and
Rogers, 2003). As with episodic retrieval, access to semantic
knowledge can be bottom up and cue driven or it can be
goal directed, requiring cognitive control (Badre and Wagner,
2007). Unlike episodic memory, however, it is easier to isolate
observed effects, such as in patients, as arising during retrieval
rather than encoding. Here again, the evidence generally
suggests that the striatum is important for control of semantic
memory retrieval.
Badre et al. (2005) investigated the neural systems supporting
the cognitive control of semantic memory retrieval. This study
focused on the contribution of left ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) to
different forms of cognitive control of memory retrieval. In a
reanalysis conducted for this review, a manipulation of
controlled semantic retrieval located activation in the left dorsal
caudate (Figure 2). Perhaps consistent with this finding, a recent
study from Han et al. (2012) found that VLPFC was preferentially
engaged during a demanding retrieval task (source memory
versus itemmemory), but only for semantically meaningful items,
suggesting that VLPFC was engaged in semantic elaboration to
enhance retrieval. The caudate showed a qualitatively identical
pattern of activation. Thus, as with the Badre et al. (2005) result
noted above, activation in caudate is observed under the same
conditions requiring cognitive control of semantic memory that
engaged VLPFC.
Consistent with the imaging data, at least one study has
located interference-induced deficits in semantic retrieval in
PD patients. Compared to age-matched controls, PD patients
showed an impaired ability to produce a semantically related
verb when presented with a noun (Crescentini et al., 2008). The
deficit was greatest in a condition where there was no strongly
associated response for the presented stimulus, and instead
many weakly associated target verbs.
Hence, as with episodic retrieval, the striatum likely interacts
with the PFC to play a causal role in the goal-directed retrieval
and selection of semantic information frommemory. Importantly,
this suggests frontostriatal circuits may play a similar role in the
cognitive control of both episodic and semantic retrieval.
However, future research will need to test whether this common
function in semantic versus episodic memory is instantiated the
same or separable frontostriatal circuits.
Hypotheses for the Role of Striatum in Declarative
Memory Retrieval
From the preceding review, it seems evident that the striatum
plays a necessary role in optimal declarative retrieval perfor-
mance, particularly under conditions requiring the cognitive
control of memory. In this way, the contribution of striatum
appears to mirror that of the frontal cortex during declarative
Table 1. Evidence Regarding Striatum in Declarative Memory
Retrieval
Effect Example Reference
Neuroimaging
Retrieval success (hits > CR) during
item recognition
Spaniol et al., 2009
Perceived retrieval success (FA > CR) Abe et al., 2008
Retrieval success > encoding success Spaniol et al., 2009
Novelty responses during novelty
detection
Bunzeck and Du¨zel, 2006
Adaptive scaling based on behavioral
significance/incentive value
of familiarity/novelty
Bunzeck et al., 2010
Incentive value of old or new memory
response
Han et al., 2010
Objective recollection (source > item
recognition)
Spaniol et al., 2009
Retrieval of weak semantic associates Badre et al., 2005
Clustered > nonclustered items
during free recall
Long et al., 2010
Increases with output position
during free recall
Long et al., 2010
Violation of expectations during retrieval O’Connor et al., 2010
Neuropsychology
Recognition memory deficits Whittington et al., 2000
Recollection deficits Edelstyn et al., 2010
Familiarity deficits Weiermann et al., 2010
Impaired recollection in deep LoP
encoding condition
Cohn et al., 2010
Impaired familiarity in shallow LoP
encoding condition
Cohn et al., 2010
Decreased semantic clustering van Oostrom et al., 2003
Difficulty overcoming retrieval
interference
Crescentini et al., 2011
Deficits in verb production based on
semantic-relatedness
Crescentini et al., 2008
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2011; Thompson-Schill et al., 1998). However, research on the
neural mechanisms of cognitive control and reinforcement
learning, outside of the context of memory, has suggested that
striatum and frontal cortex have distinct but complementary
roles (Braver and Cohen, 2000; Cools et al., 2004; O’Reilly and
Frank, 2006; McNab and Klingberg, 2008; Cools, 2011; Badre
and Frank, 2012). In particular, whereas lateral PFC supports
cognitive control by sustaining task-relevant information in
workingmemory (i.e., Miller and Cohen, 2001), the striatum plays
a key role in flexibly updating and selecting from among candi-
date frontal motor or cognitive representations based on their
utility or adaptive value for current goals (Mink, 1996; Gurney
et al., 2001; Brown et al., 2004; Cools, 2011; Frank and Badre,
2012). In this way, frontostriatal circuits allow for separable main-
tenance and updating (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber 1997), with
striatum playing a key role in mapping acquired value/utility to
action selection.Drawing on this basic cognitive control and reinforcement
learning literature, we propose three hypotheses for striatal
mechanisms during declarative memory retrieval: (1) striatum
modulates the re-encoding of retrieved items in accord with their
expected utility (i.e., adaptive encoding), (2) striatum selectively
admits information into working memory that is expected to
increase the likelihood of successful retrieval (i.e., adaptive
gating), and (3) striatum enacts adjustments in cognitive control
based on the outcome of retrieval (i.e., reinforcement learning).
These hypotheses are not intended as an exhaustive list
nor are they mutually exclusive. However, each accounts for
a portion of the extant data on striatal involvement in declarative
memory (see Table 1) and has some limited evidence in its
support.
Hypothesis 1: Retrieval as Adaptive Encoding
Striatal activation during declarative memory retrieval may serve
to modulate re-encoding of previously encoded items as a func-
tion of their behavioral relevance and their likelihood of future
utility. The goal of memory retrieval may be expressed as the
recovery of items that have an expected utility for an agent
exceeding the costs associated with retrieval itself (Anderson
and Milson, 1989). From this perspective, it is important for the
availability of items in memory to be prioritized by their expected
utility, particularly in a given task context. Among the various
cues to utility for a given item is its history of prior use: items
that were retrieved in a particular context previously are more
likely than others to be useful in that context again. So, retrieval
itself is an important cue to the utility of an item. Indeed, analyses
of retrieval that leverage prior use statistics—both in human
declarative memory and in other analogous information retrieval
contexts like library book withdrawals or Google search
queries—account for a wide range of retrieval phenomena
(Burrell, 1980; Anderson and Milson, 1989; S. Brin and L. Page,
1998, Seventh International World-Wide Web Conference
(WWW 1998), conf.; Griffiths et al., 2007). Thus, it is adaptive
to have a means of prioritizing memories based on context-
dependent prior utility.
Striatal dopamine signals elicited by retrieval could provide
one mechanism by which memories are strengthened in accord
with their context-dependent utility. It is well established that
classical midbrain dopamine structures, such as the SN and
VTA, along with medial prefrontal cortex, and ventral and dorsal
striatum respond as a function of expected utility (e.g., Knutson
et al., 2001a, 2001b, 2005). Projections from the midbrain to
hippocampus can support modulation of hippocampal encoding
by cells in these regions. For instance, dopamine can modulate
synaptic change via LTP within hippocampus, such as by
decreasing LTP thresholds within CA1 fields (Li et al., 2003;
Jay, 2003; Lemon and Manahan-Vaughan, 2006). Thus, the ni-
gra-striatal dopamine system is generally well suited for coordi-
nating dopaminergic modulation of hippocampal encoding while
processing items associatedwith high expected utility (Shohamy
and Adcock, 2010).
Recent evidence directly supports the hypothesis that the
nigra-striatal dopamine system modulates hippocampal encod-
ing as a function of the expected utility of an item (reviewed in
Shohamy and Adcock, 2010), albeit not during retrieval itself.
As already discussed, the hippocampal-VTA loop is thought toNeuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 385
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et al., 2004; Wittmann et al., 2007; Krebs et al., 2009). Moreover,
two recent studies have provided evidence for dopaminergic
modulation at encoding in accord with anticipated reward statis-
tics. Wittmann et al. (2005) demonstrated that cues predicting
subsequent reward lead to greater activation in ventral striatum
and midbrain relative to pictures that did not predict reward.
Moreover, activation in these striatal and midbrain regions
was predictive of subsequent memory at the longer test delay
for the rewarded but not the neutral pictures. By contrast,
hippocampus showed subsequent memory effects for both the
rewarded and neutral items and did not differentiate the two.
Adcock and colleagues (2006) more directly incentivized
retrieval itself, by providing participants a cue indicating that
remembering an upcoming picture during a later recognition
test would be worth either high or low reward. Again, regions
of VTA and ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) showed
greater activation to high-reward cues. Moreover, correlation
between these regions and hippocampus was positively corre-
lated with enhanced subsequent memory. Thus, these results
demonstrate that the basal ganglia can modulate hippocampal
encoding to enhance memory based on an estimate of future,
as opposed to immediate, utility.
Though theorizing has primarily focused on initial encoding,
a similar adaptive encoding account could be extended to
nigra-striatal involvement during retrieval, as well. As noted
above, the successful retrieval of an item from memory is itself
evidence that this item holds some utility in the current context.
Thus, it is generally adaptive to increase the likelihood of future
retrieval of that item, given an analogous context (also see Roe-
diger and Butler, 2011). Hence, to the extent that cells in SN/VTA
fire at retrieval—whether as an obligatory marker of retrieval
success or reflective of the expected utility of the retrieved infor-
mation for the current context—dopamine projections to hippo-
campus could enhance re-encoding and so prioritize items in
memory as a function of their retrieval history. Importantly, de-
scending inputs from ventral striatum to VTA (Figure 1B; Lisman
and Grace, 2005) could provide modulatory input related to the
adaptive value of retrieved information for current goals,
providing greater contextual specificity to re-encoding.
Adaptive encoding can provide a reasonable account of
a portion, though not all, of the evidence regarding striatal
involvement at retrieval. Certainly, retrieval success and novelty
effects in striatum, as observedwith fMRI, could reflect encoding
modulation in accord with the current utility of an item. Indeed,
even differences between source retrieval and item familiarity/
general recollection could relate to the degree of match between
retrieved information and a maintained goal. However, the
evidence of retrieval deficits in patient groups with basal ganglia
dysfunction (e.g., Cohn et al., 2010) argues that striatum also
plays a role in retrieval itself, rather than exclusively influencing
future retrieval attempts. With this in mind, we will now consider
two hypotheses that propose a role for striatum in ongoing
retrieval.
Hypothesis 2: Adaptive Gating of Working Memory
to Control Retrieval
Striatum may modulate retrieval itself in accord with the ex-
pected utility of retrieval success in the current context. As noted386 Neuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.above, if one takes the goal of memory retrieval to be recovering
those items with high expected utility given the context, then
cognitive control of memory is a means by which the priority of
items in memory can be modified on-line to increase the likeli-
hood of retrieving relevant information and minimize the influ-
ence of irrelevant information. In its specifics, this objective
can be reached by a number of means, and indeed, there are
likely several control mechanisms that operate complementarily
at different stages of retrieval. For example, attention might be
directed to cues in the environment that increase the likelihood
of successful retrieval. Likewise, a cue might be maintained in
working memory or semantically elaborated to allow it to
influence retrieval. Following retrieval, monitoring of retrieved
information and selection of information that matches decision
criteria or behavioral goals can ensure accuracy and precision.
Cognitive neuroscience research on the cognitive control of
retrieval has provided a share of evidence regarding how PFC
is organized to support these functions (e.g., Shimamura,
1995; Rugg et al., 2003; Dobbins and Wagner, 2005; Badre
and Wagner, 2007; O¨ztekin and Badre, 2011; Gallo et al., 2010).
Importantly, however, all of these cognitive control mecha-
nisms share a common demand to maintain a goal or relevant
contextual feature in working memory in order to provide
a top-down bias on current processing (Desimone and Duncan,
1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001). PFC is widely thought to support
this working memory maintenance function. Also critical for
working memory is a ‘‘gate’’ that will let goal relevant contextual
information into working memory and will keep irrelevant
information out (Hazy et al., 2006; Braver and Cohen, 2000).
The striatum may act as this working memory gate (O’Reilly
and Frank, 2006).
As one example of how gating of working memory could influ-
ence retrieval, consider that certain cues are more likely to
yield retrieval of goal-relevant information than others. Hence,
maintaining those particular cues (and not others) in working
memory—such as by sustaining a distributed pattern of neural
activity in the PFC—provides a top-down input to the MTL
system that will bias retrieval toward associates of that particular
cue. At least two capacities are critical for this mechanism
to operate: (1) cues must be identified that are of potentially
high expected value in the retrieval context, where here ex-
pected value is directly related to the likelihood of retrieving
task relevant information, and (2) high value cues should be
selectively allowed into working memory while inhibiting irrele-
vant or misleading cues.
As noted above, the striatum has been implicated in this type
of adaptive gating of PFC to support workingmemory and cogni-
tive control over action (McNab and Klingberg, 2008; Landau
et al., 2009; Cools, 2011). In computational models of working
memory (e.g., O’Reilly and Frank, 2006), neural networks simu-
late parallel corticostriatal loops that are responsible for working
memory gating, determining which representations are main-
tained in recurrent ‘‘PFC’’ layers. Based on dopaminergic
learning signals, striatum learns to gate representations into
PFC that lead to better outcomes (i.e., have high utility given
the context) and suppress those leading to less rewarding
outcomes. Once learned, gating proceeds upon encounter
with a contextual input associated with high utility. Gating itself
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(Alexander et al., 1986) that modulate maintenance activity in
PFC. Relative to the learning or evaluative component of this
system that may be more associated with ventral striatum, this
gating function may be differentially carried out by the dorsal
striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004; Cohen
and Frank, 2009).
This network architecture is generally supported by various
lines of behavioral, pharmacological, neuroimaging, and patient
work (Cools et al., 2006; Dahlin et al., 2008; Frank and Fossella,
2011; Badre and Frank, 2012), and computational models using
this frontostriatal ‘‘gating’’ network architecture have been
applied to tasks involving working memory, task-switching,
and contingent action selection (e.g., O’Reilly and Frank, 2006;
Moustafa et al., 2008; Frank and Badre, 2012). Thus, extended
to memory retrieval, cues or retrieval strategies that previous
experience has associated with high expected value for retrieval
could be gated into or excluded from working memory by these
same frontostriatal circuits.
The adaptive gating hypothesis is generally consistent with the
evidence regarding the contribution of striatum to declarative
retrieval, though limited direct evidence exists. Certainly,
retrieval success effects and novelty responses could reflect
an encounter with a cue or deploying a strategy that is relevant
to a decision about oldness/novelty. Moreover, gating demands
will increase in any retrieval context requiring more cognitive
control; as contextual elements, goals, retrieval strategies, and
interim products of retrieval are updated and maintained in
working memory. Hence, evidence of greater striatal activation
that accompanies PFC activation for source relative to item
retrieval, during controlled semantic retrieval, or with increased
output position during free recall (Long et al., 2010) is broadly
consistent with the gating hypothesis. Also, potentially consis-
tent with this interpretation, one multimodal imaging study using
fMRI and SPECT reported a correlation of increased D2 receptor
binding in striatum with greater left VLPFC activation during
proactive interference resolution (Nyberg et al., 2009).
Retrieval deficits in patients under conditions requiring greater
control could likewise be traced to ineffective working memory
gating. For example, as already discussed, the recollective
deficit observed in PD patients following deep encoding (Cohn
et al., 2010) could reflect a failure to take advantage of an effec-
tive encoding strategy, perhaps because of a failure to gate
adaptive cues or retrieval strategies into working memory that
were afforded by the deep encoding task.
Thus, across neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies,
the gating hypothesis is broadly consistent with striatal involve-
ment in cognitive control of memory retrieval. However, none of
the studies cited provide direct evidence for this interpretation
over others. Directed future research will be required to test
this hypothesis and to dissociate striatal updating/selection
from PFC maintenance during memory retrieval.
Hypothesis 3: Reinforcement Learning and Adaptation
of Cognitive Control at Retrieval
Just as striatum may mark the expected value associated with
anticipated retrieval in a particular context, it may also be impor-
tant for adapting cognitive control based on deviations from
expectations about retrieval outcome. As introduced in thepreceding discussion, striatummust acquire expectations about
the value of particular retrieval strategies and control representa-
tions in order to support a gating function. Likewise, when these
strategies prove to be ineffective or become obsolete, the
system must revise its expectations or even shift to new strate-
gies. In the reinforcement learning literature, the deviation of an
outcome from an expectation is referred to as a reward predic-
tion error (RPE; Schultz et al., 1997; Sutton and Barto, 1998;
O’Doherty et al., 2004). In order to learn the relationship between
a context, a course of action, and a particular outcome, a positive
RPE reinforces a particular behavior and makes it more likely to
be chosen in an analogous context in the future. Conversely,
a negative RPE punishes a particular course of action andmakes
it less likely to be chosen. Thus, over the course of learning,
behavior incrementally converges on statistically optimal behav-
ioral strategies given the context. In the striatum, which repre-
sentations to gate into working memory and which to suppress
may be learned through modulation of synaptic plasticity by
dopaminergic RPE signals computed in the midbrain. For
example, these signals may modulate the activity of separate
populations of ‘‘Go’’ and ‘‘NoGo’’ neurons that express D1 and
D2 dopamine receptors respectively (Shen et al., 2008; O’Reilly
and Frank, 2006).
Applied to the cognitive control of memory, RPE could hypo-
thetically operate in a similar manner, reinforcing or punishing
selection/maintenance of a particular retrieval strategy given
the context. Becker and Lim (2003) proposed a model of
semantic clustering in free recall that provides an example of
how RPE might drive adjustments in control of memory (also
see Gorski and Laird, 2011). This model sought to simulate
semantic clustering strategies during recall. Clustering was
implemented by maintaining a semantic context in ‘‘PFC’’
working memory units where it influenced serial retrieval by the
MTL/hippocampus. After each item was retrieved, it was
assessed for its familiarity. Items associated with too much or
too little familiarity were judged as errors (i.e., repetitions or intru-
sions, respectively). Either of these errors produced a negative
RPE that punished the maintenance of a particular semantic
context (i.e., retrieval strategy) in PFC. When enough such errors
accumulated, the category maintained in PFC shifted.
This model simulates classical semantic clustering, as well as
reductions in recall due to a ‘‘frontal’’ challenge, namely dividing
attention (Moscovitch, 1994). Importantly, the model highlights
that recall itself can be affected not only by demands on main-
taining a strategy but also detectingwhen a strategy has become
obsolete and a shift is in order. Consistent with this insight,
frontal patients have been shown to use fewer numbers of
semantic categories for clustering than controls, even when
controlling for deficits in the degree to which they retrieve
semantically related items consecutively (Jetter et al., 1986;
Hildebrandt et al., 1998). Hence, this model illustrates that RPE
could be an important signal used by the brain to adjust memory
retrieval strategies.
Within the declarative memory domain, there is some behav-
ioral evidence that participants adjust their retrieval strategies
based on feedback about outcomes. Han and Dobbins (2009)
manipulated explicit feedback to differentially reinforce ‘‘old’’
responses in a recognition memory task and found thatNeuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 387
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probes as ‘‘old.’’ This shift in behavior occurred gradually over
the course of learning and persisted even in blocks after the
feedback was removed. This suggests that participants had
adaptively adjusted a latent criterion threshold that they use to
evaluate retrieved mnemonic evidence and/or to choose their
response. Theoretically, these adjustments could arise from an
RPE, as in a mismatch between the expectations of participants
regarding the outcome of their report (old/new) and the feedback
they received. Such an RPE could be computed in the striatum.
Considerable evidence has already linked the basal ganglia
in general and striatum in particular to incremental adjustments
in behavior in accord with RPE (though see Berridge, 2007).
Classically, patients with basal ganglia disorders, like PD
patients, show deficits in tasks, like the weather prediction
task, in which links between a state, action, and outcome must
be learned based on reinforcement (Knowlton et al., 1996; Gluck
et al., 2002; Poldrack et al., 2001). Similarly, evidence from rein-
forcement learning tasks that estimate learning rates in individual
participants and model RPE based on a participant’s specific
sequence of responses and reward has repeatedly shown that
activation in ventral striatum tracks trial-to-trial changes in RPE
(O’Doherty et al., 2004, 2007; Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Daw et al.,
2011; Badre and Frank, 2012). There is also some evidence
that this type of reinforcement learning may influence learning
of working memory gating functions by dorsal striatum (Frank
and O’Reilly, 2006; Moustafa et al., 2008; Badre and Frank,
2012). Thus, RPE may play a similar role in memory control
and either reinforce memory control strategies or drive changes
in them in accord with the deviation from expected retrieval
outcomes.
As with the gating hypothesis, the reinforcement learning
hypothesis is broadly consistent with evidence linking striatum
to cognitive control. Retrieval success effects could reflect the
positive RPE associated with the success of a retrieval strategy
(i.e., achieving a goal; e.g., Han et al., 2010). Likewise, evidence
linking striatum to retrieval tasks that place greater demands on
cognitive control could reflect adjustments in control as retrieval
unfolds.
More directly, there is also some limited evidence that striatal
activation can vary as a function of deviations from expectation
during memory retrieval. Tricomi and Fiez (2008) reported
a paired-associate learning task, in which participants first
learned the associations by randomly choosing between two
answer choices and then receiving feedback on their accuracy.
On subsequent memory trials, participants made their decisions
based on their memory of the correct response from earlier trials,
again receiving feedback on their performance. Caudate activa-
tion was evident on the memory trials but not the initial learning
trials, suggesting that the caudate was selectively engaged
when participants are expecting the feedback to provide infor-
mation about the accuracy of their memory decisions. O’Connor
and colleagues (2010) examined the interaction between expec-
tations and retrieval success effects by manipulating partici-
pants’ expectations of upcoming oldness in a recognition
memory test. Participants saw a valid or invalid anticipatory
cue (‘‘likely old’’ or ‘‘likely new’’) before each recognition judg-
ment. The caudate was active not only in the ‘‘retrieval success’’388 Neuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.contrast, but also in a contrast comparing invalid cue trials
versus valid cue trials, suggesting that the caudate activity
may serve as a marker of the violation of memory expectations.
To summarize, then, there is evidence that people can take
advantage of feedback to adjust their memory retrieval strate-
gies; a process that could reasonably be assumed to rely on
some form of RPE. And, there is evidence that striatal activation
tracks deviations from expectation during retrieval tasks and so
is potentially modulated by RPE. These observations motivate
the hypothesis that RPE signals in striatum support experi-
ence-driven adjustments in cognitive control strategies during
retrieval. However, it remains to be demonstrated that these
RPE signals are the source of behavioral adjustments in memory
control.
Conclusion
There has been a growing recognition of the role of striatum
across cognition, extending beyond basic motor control and
being implicated in domains such as action selection, working
memory, reinforcement learning, and cognitive control. Indeed,
the results reviewed here suggest that striatum interacts with
other brain regions, such as prefrontal cortex and hippocampus,
in declarative memory retrieval. In particular, the extant neuroi-
maging and neuropsychological literature implicate striatum in
oldness and novelty detection, goal-relevant decision processes
in recognition memory, and the cognitive control of episodic and
semantic memory (Table 1).
Considering these observations, it is evident that striatum
plays a critical role in optimal memory retrieval, but the specific
mechanistic contributions of striatum are underspecified.
Drawing on existing theories of striatal function, we have
proposed three possible ways in which striatummight contribute
to declarative memory retrieval, namely through (1) adaptive
encoding at retrieval, (2) adaptive gating of working memory to
control retrieval, and (3) reinforcement learning of retrieval strat-
egies. These hypotheses are likely not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, it seems likely that all three may characterize a compo-
nent of what striatum and/or the broader basal ganglia system is
supporting during retrieval. Moreover, there may be differences
within striatum regarding how these hypothesized functions
are supported. For example, the difference between adaptive
gating and reinforcement learning/evaluation of memory control
strategies—a kind of actor-critic architecture for memory control
(e.g., Bornstein and Daw, 2011; Botvinick et al., 2009; Niv, 2009;
Holroyd and Yeung, 2012)—could be supported by dorsal
versus ventral striatum respectively.
It is also important to clarify that the hypothetical contributions
of striatum to declarative retrieval performance proposed here
need not exclusively support those cognitive control processes
that lead to improved retrieval itself. Cognitive control can affect
the accuracy and precision of retrieval, as illustrated by the
examples provided above. However, cognitive control may
also adjust decision criteria and response selection policy during
memory tasks in order to gain positive task outcomes, indepen-
dently of the underlying retrieval outcomes. In other words,
cognitive control may also bias reports during memory tasks
as opposed to affecting discrimination, per se (Lauwereyns
et al., 2002; Maddox and Bohil, 2005). And indeed, certain
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(old versus new, for example; Han and Dobbins, 2009; Han
et al., 2010) are likely examples of adaptation occurring at
this decision stage, as opposed to affecting retrieval or
discrimination directly. Nevertheless, whether cognitive control
mechanisms are directed toward achieving a particular retrieval
goal, such as recovering a particular type of information from
memory or maximizing positive outcomes by biasing reports,
striatum may play a similar role in utility-driven updating and
selection of working memory representations to influence
performance.
Finally, it is important to note that though we have drawn an
analogy between striatal function during declarative memory
tasks and existing models of striatum developed outside of
the memory domain, mapping value to memory signals and
processes—which is at the base of all three hypotheses—is
different in important ways from typical reinforcement learning
tasks that map value to a stimulus-action pairing. In particular,
declarative memory representations are abstract and multidi-
mensional and are shaped by the retrieval process itself. Thus,
items or contexts with different features may elicit similar
memory signals and conversely items with highly overlapping
features may be treated differently depending on the nature of
the memory signal being computed. Thus, in the context of
memory, striatal function should not be conceptualized as
mapping value to stimulus-action pairs. Rather, one must
consider the problem of assigning value to levels and types of
mnemonic representations and processes. Similarly, valuation
itself within the memory domain is somewhat different than in
traditional contexts. For example, value could be based on the
match of a latent memory state to expectations, the degree of
effort minimization that follows from successful retrieval, and/
or the variability in retrieval outcome (akin to outcome variance
in reinforcement learning; e.g., Niv et al., 2012). Hence, moving
forward, it is crucial to study the contribution of striatum to
declarative memory in the context of memory retrieval itself,
rather than by analogy with other domains. Future directed
investigations will be required to provide a more concrete view
of the mechanistic role of striatum in declarative memory
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